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I.  Introduction
Previous  models  of  economic  growth  with  environmental  degradation  or
resource  exhaustibility  have  focused  predominantly  on  the  socially  optimal,
i.e.,  efficient,  path  of  growth,  thus  omitting  an  analysis  of  the  equilibrium
path  and  how  such  a  path  might  diverge  from  the  efficient  path.  As  such,
they  have  emphasized  the  potential  of  an  environmentally  or  resource
constrained  economy  to  grow,  as  it  were,  by  the  hands  of  a  central  planner,
but  not  the  actual  long  run  growth  path  of  the  economy.  Since  the  latter
reflects  market  and/or  institutional specificity  of  the  economy  but  the  former
does  not,  ignoring  the  equilibrium  path  reduces  the  richness  of  the  analysis
under  different  market  and/or  institutional  structures.  Further,  by  ignoring
the  equilibrium  path  as  a  point  of  reference  little,  if  any,  insight  is
provided  for  policy  analysis  and  the  question  of  how  the  economy  may  move  from
the  equilibrium  to  the  efficient  path.  A  focus  on  the  role  of  policy  is
particularly  important,  given  the  magnitude  of  environmental  problems  around
On  the  exhaustible  resource  and  growth  literature  see  for  example,  Solow
(1974)  and  Solow  and  Wan  (1976),  Hartwick  (1978),  Ayers  (1988).  On  the
environment  and  growth  literature  see  Foster  (1973),  D'arge  and  Kogiku  (1973)
Krautkraemer  (1985)  and  Smith  (1977).  [See  Pezzey,  1989  for  a  review].
Although  Smith  (1989)  does  emphasize  the  decentralized  interpretations  of
optimal  control  theory,  the  central  shortcoming  of  his  paper  is  that  the  rate
of  environmental  degradation  is  specified  exogenously  via  a  functional  form,
rather  than  endogenously derived,  as  in  this  paper.the  globe,  and  the  urgency  it  presents  to the  policy  makers2
The  literature  that  does  focus  on  how  the  equilibrium  and  the  efficient
paths  diverge  are  the  "new  growth  theories",  also  known  as  the  theories  of
"endogenous  growth."  These  theories  emphasize  the  role  of  human  capital,
technology,  R  & D  or  fiscal  policy  instruments  (e.g.,  Lucas,  1988;  Romer,
1986,  1987,  1990;  Barro,  1990,  Rebelo,  1990)  in  economic  growth.  But  the
approach  taken  in  the  endogenous  growth  theories  has  not  yet  been  adopted  to
the  case  of  environmental  or  natural  resource  degradation.  This  is
surprising,  because  the  key  to  generating  a  departure  of  the  equilibrium  and
the  efficient  paths  in  the  new  growth  theories  is  the  role  of  externalities,
and  externalities  are  of  course  at  the  root  of  environmental  and  resource
degradation  problems.
This  paper  studies  the  growth  of  an  economy  with  environmental
degradation,  using  an  endogenous  growth  approach.  Consequently,  the  paper
also  contributes  to  the  endogenous  growth  literature.  Growth  in  this  paper  is
a  consequence  of  the  optimizing  behavior  of  infinitely  lived  atomistic  agents
where  environmental/resource  externalities  are  present.  With  this  approach  we
are  able  to  derive  equilibrium  and  efficient  paths  under  different  scenarios
and  to  shed  light  on  the  type  and  direction  of  economic  policy  for  sustainable
growth.
A  second  area  of  contribution  is  the  key  role  of  health.  Previous  models
of  growth  which  address  environmental  degradation,  ignore  the  impact  on  the
2Witness  for  example  the  UN  sponsored  Rio  De  Janeiro  meeting  in  June  of  1992.
The  World  Bank  will  devote  its  1992  volume  entirely  to  the  environment  (World
Bank,  1992).  One  may  also  cite  the  Bank's  1991  Progress  Report  on  the
environment  (World  Bank,  1991),  or  the  volume  edited  by  Schramm  and  Warford
(1989)  for  the  Bank,  and  the  World  Bank  Working  paper  by  John  Pezzey  (1989).environmental  degradation  on  health  per  se.  Yet,  concern  over  the
environmental  effects  of  health  is  increasingly  evident,  both  by  the  growth  in
demand  for  health  and  by  the  increase  in  the  knowledge  of  environmental
substances  that  affect  health,  entering  through  the  food  chain  (See,  for
example,  Caswell,  1991),  or  through  air  and  water  pollution,  or  leading  to  a
deterioration  of  the  upper  atmospheres  capacity  to  filter  harmful  radiation.
At  the  same  time,  policies  to  limit  the  application  of  chemicals  in  food
production,  the  control  of  affluent  and  emission  discharges  from  plants  and
various  and  other  efforts  to  limit  exposure  to  harmful  substances  tends  to
increase  production  costs.  The  increase  in  costs  brings  into  question  whether
a  country,  in  the  presence  of  policies  to  address  these  concerns,  can  sustain
its  historic  levels  of  economic  growth  or  whether  economic  growth  is  an
appropriate  welfare  index.
Conceptually,  because  health  affects  the  agents'  utility  function,  and
3
because  environmental  quality  affects  health  any  endogenous  growth  model
which  addresses  environmental  degradation  needs  to  take  into  account  health  as
a  key  intermediate  variable  between  environment  and  the  utility  function.  In
the  literature  that  discusses  the  effects  of  environment  on  utility,  such  a
discussion  takes  place  in  terms  of  the  direct  amenity  value  of  the
environment,  as  illustrated  for  example  in  the  model  by  Krautkraemer  (1985),
3An  example  of  a  rigorous  micro-level  study  that  documents  the  impact  of
"micro-level"  environmental  effects  on  health  at  the  household  level,  such  as
smoking,  is  the  study  by  Rosenzweig  and  Schultz  (1983).  However,  their  study
is  concerned  with  factors  that  are  subject  to  choice  as  in  the  case  of
smoking,  but  not  the  broad  aggregate  environmental  factors,  that  are  external
to  the  household  as,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  air  pollution.  The  latter  is
the  subject  of  this  paper.
3or  in  the  discussion  by  McConnel  (1985).  Thus,  the  effect  of  environment  on
utility  via  health  has  not  been  addressed.  Although  for  some  simple  problems,
the  amenity  effect  may  be  viewed,  analytically,  as  encompassing  the  health
effect,  this  is  not  in  general  the  case  because  of  the  more  complex  relation
between  health  and  factors  other  than  the  environment.  This  is  illustrated  in
the  example  of  Section  IV.  In  such  cases,  introduction  of  the  health  variable
poses  analytically  distinct  issues,  that  cannot  be  addressed  by  a  mere
re-interpretation  of  the  amenity  effect.  Moreover,  even  in  the  simplest
cases,  the  task  of  evaluating  the  amenity  value  of  the  environment  for  the
purpose  of  policy  analysis  presents  great  difficulty  as  reflected,  for
example,  in  the  contentious  area  of  "contingent  valuation"  that  attempts  to
gauge  "willingness  to  pay".  For  this  reason,  setting  environmental  standards
by  health  considerations  has  been  advocated  as  a  substitute  (e.g.  Hueting,
1989). 4
Three  models  of  the  endogenous  growth  variety  are  presented.  The  first
two  are  extremely  simple  models  that  emphasize  the  divergence  between  the
equilibrium  and  efficient  paths  when  environmental  quality  is  either  a
consequence  of  consumption  externality  (Section  II)  or  production  externality
(Section  III).  Health  in  these  models  is  not  a  crucial  variable  and  acts
simply  as  an  intermediary  between  environment  and  the  utility  function.
Although  certain  environmentally  harmful  products,  such  as  CFCs  may  be  a
by-product  of  both  the  consumption  and  the  production  processes,  we  shall
separate  the  two  sources,  studying  the  consumption  induced  by-product  in
Section  II,  and  the  production  induced  by  products  in  Section  III.  Little  is
gained  by  studying  the  two  effects  simultaneously.
4For  further  discussion  see  S.  El  Serafy  and  E.  Lutz  (1989,  pp.  23-38)The  third  model  (Section  IV)  constitutes  the  main  part  of  the  paper.
This  model  also  emphasizes  the  divergence  between  equilibrium  and  efficient
paths;  but  it  also  emphasizes  the  crucial  role  of  health  as  a  non-trivial
variable  in  the  study  of  environment  and  growth.  It  studies  a  class  of
problems,  preponderant  in  the  real  world,  in  which  health  is  subject  to  both
the  aggregate  external  effects  of  environment,  as  in  the  first  two  models,  but
also  a  "residue  effect"  embodied  in  the  product  that  is  consumed.  Further,
the  profit  maximizing  behavior  of  producers  means  that  the  external  and  the
internal  effects  are  interrelated  and  subject  to  trade-offs  via  a
technological  frontier.  We  call  the  first  effect,  disembodied effect  and  the
second,  embodied  effect.  The  clearest  example  of  such  class  of  problems  is
the  use  of  preservatives  in  food  which  retard  spoilage  but  which  may  be
potentially  carcinogenic  (as  in  the  case  of  Nitrates),  versus  the  use  of
refrigeration  which  reduces  the  need  for  preservatives,  but  intensify  ozon
depletion  and  are  therefore  indirectly  harmful  to  health  via  their
environmental  effect.
Section  V  makes  some  concluding  remarks.
II.  Environment as  a  Negative Consumption Externality
The  first  simple  model  depicts  a  disembodied  effect  of  a  consumer  induced
CFC-ozone  depletion  or  a  CO2  emission  type  of  problem.  For  the  present,  we
abstract  both  from  the  producer  induced  effects  as  well  as  the  mentioned
embodied  health  effect.  Households  maximize  the  utility,
W  =  J  u(C,H)e  dt  (1)
0
5where  C  is  a  composite  consumption  good  and  H  is  health.  Suppose  H  =  H(E),
(H'  >  0),  where  E  denotes  environmental  quality,  or  in  terms  of  the
illustrative  problem,  protection  from  exposure  to  harmful  radiation.  In  this
section,  E  is  assumed  fixed  to  households,  i.e.  it  is  viewed  by  each  household
as  unaffected  by  choice  of  consumption,  C,  but  varies  adversely  with  C  in  the
aggregate,  as  depicted  by  a  reduction  in  the  extent  of  radiation-free
environment,  in  the  CFC-Ozone  illustration.  For  simplicity,  let  health  be
determined  linearly  by  environmental  quality,  with  scales  appropriately  chosen
so  that,  H(E)  =  E.  Then  we  have:
H  =  E  for  each  household  (2a)
-b
H  =  E  =  aC  (a,b>0)  in  the  aggregate  (2b)
where  (-)  in  equation  (2a)  indicates  that  the  variable  is  exogenous  to  the
individual  household.  In  this  and  the  next  section,  households  are  producers
and  consumers,  since  separation  of  the  two  tasks  does  not  enhance  the
analysis.  The  household  maximization  is  subject  to  the  budget  constraint:
C  =  f(K)  - I  (3)
A  utility  function  of  the  form,
u(CH)  =  [(CH)1-1]/(1-o),  (a  >  0)  (4)
is  assumed.  This  form  is  customary  in  dynamic  problems,  with  the  simplifying
constraint  here  that  C  and  H  have  the  same  weight  in  the  utility  function.
Assuming  a  simple  production  function  of  the  form,  f(K)  =  AK,  the  growth  rate
of  the  decentralized  economy  is:SC/C  =  A-p  (5)
Growth  is  positive  if  the  productivity  of  capital  (A)  exceeds  the  discount
rate,  and  the  presence  of  health  factor  makes  no  difference  to  the
decentralized  economy's  growth  rate  because  it  is  ignored  by  atomistic  agents.
The  transversality  condition  requires  that  A<p/(l-o).5  This  imposes  an  upper
bound  on  the  productivity  of  the  economy,  and  also  implies  that  intertemporal
substitution  be  inelastic  (ar<l).
Efficient (Socially  Optimum)  Path
With  the  existence  of  the  negative  externality  as  represented  by  equation
(2b),  the  choice  of  C  and  H  to  maximize  (1)  yields  the  socially  optimal  growth
rate:
A-p
S=  ---  where,  r  - +  +  (l-cr)b.  (6)
The  parameter  *  may  be  thought  of,  as  the  effective  intertemporal
substitution  elasticity.  The  necessary  condition  for  the  stability  of  this
system  is  that  the  integrand  be  concave  in  K  (Kamien  and  Shwartz,  1991,  p.
128).  This  will  require  that  b  <1, 6  which  imposes  an  upper  limit  on  the
Using  a  Current  Value  Hamiltonian  approach,  where  t  =  U(C(t),H(C(t))  +
A[AK(t)-C(t)],  the  transversality  condition  is  that,  limit  e-t(t)K(t)  =  0.
t-4>
The  multiplier  A  evolves  according  the  first  order  condition,  RC  =  pA  - A,  or
A/A  =  (p-A)  which  gives  A(t)  =  A e ( p - A)t.  Substituting  for  this  and  for  K(t)
0
=  K  e  into  the  transversality  condition  we  find  this  condition  is  satisfied
0
if  y  <  A,  or  A  <  p/(l-o).
6Denote  the  integrand  by  V.  Then  8Zv/8K2 -ePt  u'(.)(l-b)o*/C<  0,  if  b  <1.extent  of  the  elasticity  of  health  to  consumption.  Again,  the  transversality
condition  requires  that  A<  p/(l-a*),  implying  that  or*  <  1.
Since  a-  <  1  from  above,  from  the  definition  of  or*  we  can  see  that,  a%*  >
7
oT.  Thus  it  follows  from  a  comparison  of  equations  (5)  and  (6),  that  the
efficient  growth  path  is  below  the  equilibrium  path,  and  furthermore  that  it
falls with  higher  values  of  the  parameter  b:  In  sum:
a  < 1 ==-  *  >  ===  y  <  X  ; 87  /8b <  0.  (7)
8  S
To  explain,  equation  (7)  suggests  that  if  consumers  were  able  to  influence  the
level  C,  collectively  or  via  the  government,  they  would  prefer  to  increase
consumption  over  time  by  a  smaller amount  than  of  they  if  acted  atomistically.
This  would  then  slow  down  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation  as  well.
Path of  Environmental Decay
Environmental  quality,  c  =  E/E,  deteriorates,  in  equilibrium,  at  the  rate
given  by  equations  2b  and  5,  and  along  the  efficient  path,  at  the  rate  given
by  equations  2b  and  6.  These  are:
C =  -by  =  -bP  (8) 0%
e  =  -by  =  -bA  (9)
Equation  (8)  tells  us  that  along  the  equilibrium  path,  environmental
quality  (and  thus  health)  deteriorates  at  a  rate  that  is  in  proportion  to  the
Notice  that  because  the  transversality  condition  for  the  y  path  means  that  o<
P
<  1  which  in  turn  implies  o*  >  <o,  and  because  *'  <1,  is  implied  by  the
transversality  condition  for  the  y  path,  it  follows  that  l>o~*>o  in  this  case,
so  that  o  <1  condition  is  reproduced  again.
8size  of  b.  It  turns  out  that  environmental  quality  also  deteriorates  in
proportion  to  the  size  of  b  along  the  efficient  path:  Substituting  for  *  =
+  (l-r)b,  into  equation  (9)  and  differentiating  with  respect  to  b,  we  find
that  de  /db  <  0.
S
An  important  result  is  the  fact  that  because  environmental  quality
deteriorates  in  proportion  to  the  growth  rate  of  the  economy,  it  must
deteriorate  at  a  slower  rate  along  the  efficient  path  (e  Jl<|I•),  because  of
the  slower  growth  rate  along  that  path  ('  <y).  This  result  suggests  that  even
S
for  a  homothetic  utility  function,  maintaining  the  same  level  of  environmental
quality  requires  continuous  investment  in  environmental  quality  at  a  rate
given  by  I  c  or  1  c  (as  the  case  may  be).  The  agents'  willingness  to  pay  for
S
the  quality  of  environmental  is  likely  to  be  greater,  at  higher  levels  of
consumption  per  capita,  in  a  model  based  on  non-homothetic  utility  functions
that  reflect  the  agents'  increasing  valuation  of  the  relative  significance  of
the  health  and  environmental  factors.  In  such  a  model,  agents  would  like
consume  less  of  the  "bad"  environmental  effects  at  higher  levels  of
consumption  per  capita,  along  the  efficient  path,  which  in  turn  decreases  the
rate  of  environmental  degradation  along  that  path.  If  investments  in
environmental  quality  were  permitted,  agents  would  also  be  willing  to  invest
more  on  the  environment  relative  to  the  homothetic  case.  The  usefulness  of
such  an  observation  is  transparent  in  comparing  the  sustainability  of  growth
in  developed  versus underdeveloped  countries.
Finally,  it  may  noted  that  underlying  these  results  is  an  important
conceptual  issue  regarding  the  role  of  induced  technological  change  that  we
will  address  in  the  concluding  section  of  of  the  paper.III.  Environment as  a  Negative  Production Externality
So  far,  we  have  focused  on  the  negative  environmental  consequences  of
aggregate  consumption.  Attention  is  now  placed  on  a  health  externality  as  a
product  of  the  production  process.  In  this  case,  we  replace  the  aggregate
heath  function  in  equation  (2b)  with  the  function,
H  =  E  =  af(K)  (a,3>0) in  the  aggregate  (10)
The  health  effect  to  the  individual  is  viewed  as  exogenous  and  given  by
equation  (2a).  Also,  assume  that  f(K)  =AK,  as  before.  Thus,  the
decentralized  growth  outcome  X  remains  unchanged,  as  represented  by  equation
(5).  However,  the  socially  optimum  path  is  different.  Application  of
the  calculus  of  variation  yields:
S/C  - A(1-3) -p  (11)
'  o'-(1-p)  ( 1
While  the  second  order  condition  does  not  constrain  1  in  this  case,  13  >1  can
still  be  ruled  out  since  that  would  imply  8y /9p  >0  which  is  implausible.
Thus,  we  again  focus  on  the  case  of  3 <  1.
As  in  the  previous  model,  we  find  that,  By  /3ft  <  0,  and  correspondingly,
ys  <  7 ,  i.e.,  the  efficient  growth  path  is  below  the  equilibrium  path.  In
this  case,  since  accumulation  is  the  source  of  adverse  environmental  and
health  effects  the  central  planner  chooses  a  growth  path  that  implies  a  slower
accumulation  rate  i.e.,  one  that  is  slower  than  the  decentralized  economy's
path.  The  transversality  condition  is  also  satisfied  if  A  <  (l-o)p/(1-1),
8
imposing  an  upper  bound  on  the  productivity  of  the  capital  stock.  As  before,
8
To  prove  this,  note  that  the  Current  Value  Hamiltonian  now  includes  in  the
objective  function,  an  explicit  dependence  on  K,  i.e.,
103<  1,  implies  that a  <  1.
Path of  Environmental Decay
Along  the  equilibrium  path,  environmental  quality  deteriorates  at  the
rate  given  by  equations  (5)  and  (10),  and  along  the  efficient  path  it
deteriorates  at  a  rate  given  by  equations  (11)  and  (10).  These  are:
e  =  -7  =  - A- p   (12)
A(1-()  - p c  = -.3  =  - (-1)  p-(13) s  s  o(1-g)
Again,  the  quality  of  the  environment  deteriorates  at  a  slower  rate  along  the
efficient  path  (Ie |<e  I),  because  of  the  slower  growth  rate  along  that  path
(Y <Y).  Beyond  this  result,  the  efficient  path  e  does  exhibit  an  interesting
S  £
property  with  respect  to  3,  namely  the  existence  of  a  threshold  value  of  3,
say  p  ,  which  minimizes  c  . Differentiating  c  with  respect  to  3  and  setting
to zero  P  satisfies  the  equation:
2
A(l-  )  - 23 p  +p  =  0  (14)
0  0
Further,  studying  the  curvature  of  c  (3)  we  find that:
9
a2  /8f2  I  >0  (15)
0
X  =  U[C(t),af(K(t))  ]  +  A[AK(t)-C(t)],
so  that  the  multiplier  A  evolves  according  to  or  X  =  (p-A)A  - f(t),  where,
Q(t)  =  const.C(t) -f(K(t)'-  Thus,  the  growth  of  A  is  bound  from
above,  i.e.  A(t)  A e (p - A)t.  Thus,  an  upper  bound  for  the  transversality
O
condition,  lim  e-P A(t)K(t)  =  0,  may  be  found  which  is  y  <  A,  or  substituting
t-ooo
from  (11),  A  <  (l-r)p/(l-p).
11Thus,  c  has  a  local  minimum  at  1  . This  is  an  interesting  result  because  it
0
points  to  the  existence  of  trade-offs,  along  the  efficient  path,  between  the
two  opposite  effects  of  3  on  environmental  quality;  A  direct  worsening  effect
and  an  indirect  or  induced  ameliorating  effect  (via  a  reduction  in  the  growth
rate).  This  situation  is  depicted  in  Figure  1.  Note  that  this  means  that
under  the  efficient  path,  the  rate  of  environmental  deterioration  is  bounded
so  that  it  cannot  deteriorate  beyond  c  =e(P  ).  As  shown  in  the  figure,  no
m  o
such  trade  offs,  and  thus  boundedness,  exists  along  the  equilibrium  path  c  so
that  a  rise  in  (3  unambiguously  worsens  the  quality  of  the  environment,  which
is  already  deteriorating  at  a  more  rapid rate  than  .
S
An  important  point  of  both  these  models  is  that  circumstances  exist  where
maximizing  the  growth  rate  is  inconsistent  with  maximizing  welfare.  In  this
case,  because  of  the  adverse  effects  of  capital  accumulation  or  consumption  on
utility,  the  welfare  of  the  society  rises  more  rapidly  in  a  social  optimal
regime  than  in  a  decentralized  regime,  but  growth  rate  rise  less  rapidly  in
the  former  than  in  the  latter  regime.
IV.  Environment, Health and  Growth: Embodied & Disembodied Effects
In  the  models  of  the  past  two  sections,  household  health  is  completely
determined  by  the  quality  of  its  external  environment.  Thus,  no  individual
household  can  control  its  own  health  directly  or  individually,  but  only
indirectly  through  influencing  the  quality  of  its  external  environment  and  in
the  aggregate,  through  the  change  in  the  behavior  of  all  households.
Effectively,  the  atomistic  market  mechanism  fails  to  maximize  utility,  i.e,
the  rate  of  economic  growth  attained  from  the  market  is  not  consistent  with
12maximum  utility  or  "quality  of  life."  In  this  case,  a  policy  must  be  carried
out  by  some  form  of  institutional  innovation  that  mimics  the  heavy  hand  of  a
central  planner.
By  contrast,  the  present  section  studies  a  class  of  problems  in  which
health  is  subject  to  both  the  aggregate  external  effects  of  environment,  as
well  as  an  internal  effect  that  is  (partly)  endogenous  to  households,  and  can
be  influence  through  their  consumption  behavior.  Further,  the  external  and
the  internal  effects  are  subject  to  trade-offs  via  technological  frontier.  We
call  the  first  effect,  the  disembodied  effect  and  the  second,  the  embodied
effect.
An  example  of  such  class  of  problems  is  the  use  of  preservatives  in  food
which  retard  spoilage  but  which  may  be  potentially  carcinogenic  (as  in  the
case  of  Nitrates),  versus  the  use  of  refrigeration  which  reduce  the  need  for
preservatives,  but  intensify  ozon  depletion  and  are  therefore  indirectly
harmful  to  health.  First,  note  that  although  the  concentration  of  preserving
substances  are  outside  the  control  of  the  individual  consumers,  consumers  can
still  control  their  total  ingestion  of  consumables  thereby  reducing  their
detrimental  health  affects.  Thus,  even  though  an  external  effect  remains
through  consumer's  inability  to  influence  the  concentration  of  the  residue,
the  market  can  still  act,  through  consumer's  demand  structure,  as  a  mechanism
to  induce  producers  to  transform  the  composition  of  the  final  product  away
from  inputs  that  leave  traces  of  contaminants  embodied  in  the  product.  In
effect  existence  of  preservatives  may  be  a  hedonic  characteristic  of  the
product  consumed.  However,  the  scenario  does  not  end  here.  For,  there  are
trade-offs  in  the  health  consequences  of  the  producers'  choice  of  inputs,
which  impacts  environment  and  thus  health  but  are  disembodied from  the  product
consumed,  and  external  to  individuals.  In  the  above  example,  as  producers
13Figure 1
Environmental Decay  in  a  Simple  Endogenous Growth Model
of Production Induced Externality
m
icient  path
I  C.  0 %LvV  I,-  %IGLY  c"A-wL·b  k  "'""LFigure 2
Environment-Health Interactions in a  CFC-OZON Type  Problem
Input,
Affecting  ___Env  ironmental
Environ.  Quality
S|Investment  4
S[OutputI  =  [Incomel  =  +  Health-----  Utility
-----------------  Consumption--
SK--  . - - - -i
.f-  - - - - - - - - |  - - - - - --
Input,  Containing  __
Residuereduce  their  use  of  preservatives,  in  response  to  market  demand,  they  may  use
refrigeration  more  intensively,  thus  affecting  health  adversely  via  the  ozon
depletion  factor.
Given  the  above  background  the  question  of  interest  is  this:  What  is  the
mechanism  for  sustainable  growth  in  this  class  of  economies  and  what  are  the
nature  of  trade-offs  involved  for  the  growth  path  of  the  economy?
To  study  this  class  of  problems,  the  consumption  and  the  production
behavior  are  assumed  to  be  separated.  Hence,  proceeding  in  the  spirit  of  the
framework  developed  in  the  previous  section,  consider  an  economy  with  a  single
composite  good,  C,  that  contains  traces  of  an  "unhealthy"  residue  of  a  given
concentration,  z.  The  residue  is  associated  with  an  input  X  (e.g.,
preservatives  in  food)  that  is  employed  in  the  final  production  of  C.  In
addition  to  X,  firms  also  employ  another  factor,  R  (e.g.  refrigerators),  whose
use  does  not  pose  direct  health  hazards  but  indirect  hazards  through  its
external  effect  via  the  environment  and  thus  health.  Both  X  and  R  are
produced  via  another  production  process,  using  capital,  and  are  thus  treated
as  intermediate  factors  of  production.  Figure  (2)  depicts  this  model.
Consumers  maximize  (1)  subject  to  the  knowledge  that  H  is  adversely
affected  by  the  overall  level  of  the  contaminants  consumed  and  by  the
environment.  Since  the  ingestion  of  the  substance  associated  with  X  is  a
product  of  concentration  z  (fixed  to  consumers)  and  consumption  C  (choice
variable),  consumers'  health  can  in  part  be  influenced  via  individual  C,  as
discussed  above.  Environment,  however,  remains  an  externality  and  is  thus
exogenous  to  individual  consumers,  while  it  is  of  course  impacted  adversely  in
the  aggregate  by  the  increased  utilization  of  the  input  R,  as  per  example
above.  The  health  production  function  is:
H  =  h[zC,  E(R)]  with  h <0,hz>0  E'<O.  (16)
14The  trade-off  in  the  utility  function  consists  of  the  positive  direct  effect
of  C  on  utility  and  its  negative  indirect  effect  (via  health)  on  utility.
Each  consumer  faces  given  values  of  z  and  R  (hence  the  bar  on  both),  but  z  and
R  can  vary  in  the  aggregate.
Consumers  are  assumed  to  own  the  stock  of  the  firms'  capital,  renting  it
to firms,  at  a  rental  rate,  r.  The  budget  constraint  is:
PC  =  rK  - K  (17)
where  P  is  the  price  of  the  consumer  good,  C,  relative  to  the  capital  good,  K.
Consumers  maximize  W  in  equation  (1)  subject  to  the  constraints  (16)  and  (17).
Firms  produce  Q  amount  of  the  final  good,  by  employing  the  intermediate
factors  X,  R,  that  contain  the  embodied  adverse  health  effects  and  the
disembodied  adverse  health  effect  (via  environment),  and  the  environmentally
neutral  factor,  K,  in  a  production  process  represented  by  constant  returns  to
scale.
Q  =  f(K  ,R,X)  =  K  1--  RX  (18)
Q  Q
Thus,  the  concentration  ratio,  z,  is taken  from  this  relation  as  follows:
x 1-3
z  =X/Q  =  (19)
Q
The  intermediate  factors  X  and  R  are  produced  by  the  capital  stock  in  a
simple  linear  (CRS)  technology:
X  =  e(K  )  =  mK  (20)
x  x
R  =  9(KR)  =  nKR  (21)
Capital  is  assumed  mobile  between  sectors  X,  R  and  Q.  Its  supply  (stock)  at
15any  time  t,  is  determined  by  consumers  (via  ownership  of  the  stock  of  firms)
who  determine  its  path  K(t)  optimally.  The  allocation  of  K(t)  between  the
three  sectors  is  determined  by  equality  of  its  marginal  productivity  in  the
two  sectors.  The  externality  is  that  the  market  provides  a  sub-optimal
solution  to  this  problem  because  the  privately  optimal  path  of  K(t)  and  C(t)
does  not  provide  incentives  for  technical  substitution  between
environmentally,  and  thus  health-neutral,  investments  (K)  and  health
non-neutral  inputs  R  or  X  (whether  the  health  effect  is  direct,  as  in  the  case
of  X,  or  via  the  environment,  as  in  the  case  of  R).
Consumer Maximization Problem:  The  Intertemporal Analysis
To  maximize  (1)  subject  to  (16)  and  (17),  apply  Euler's  equation,  8V/8K  -
d/dtaV/aK,  to get:
(u c+  zhc u)(r-p - P/P)  +
[u c+  2zhCCH  +  (hc)uHH+  hCC u )z]c  0  (22)
Note  that  P/P  allows  for  change  over  time  in  the  relative  price  of  C,  so
that  P/P  is  in  general  nonzero.  Rational  Expectations  is  assumed  to  operate
on  this  variable.  Thus,  the  value  of  P/P  is  assumed  to  be  correctly  perceived
by  consumers  as  reflecting  the  relative  inflation  of  the  final  good's  price  in
the  market.  Although  prices  will  be  constant  and  thus  P/P  =  0  when  the
technology  exhibits  constant  returns  to  scale,  P/P  need  not  be  zero  in
general.  In  any  case,  the  determination  of  this  variable  must  await  the
general  equilibrium  considerations.
To  carry  the  analysis  beyond  this  point,  we  shall  need  to  specify
functional  forms.  Let  the  utility  function  be  of  the  form  of  previous
sections:
16u(CH)  =  [(CH)1-o-1]/(r  - ),  (r  >  0)
Also  let,
H  =  h[zC,E(R)]  =  a(zC) -  E(R)  =  A(zC)  (R)  (e8,'>0)  (24)
where  for  simplicity  the  adverse  effect  of  the  intermediate  factor  R  on  the
environment,  E,  is  captured  by  a  inverse  function  of  R,  E(R)  =  e/R  (so  that  A
8' =  ae  is  a  constant).  Using  equations  (23)  and  (24)  in  (22)  and  simplifying
the  outcome,  we  find  the  growth  rate  of  consumption,  for  given  levels  of  z  and
R,  to  be:
r-p-y
S=  C/C  =  .-  (25)
c
where  y  =  P/P,  and  T  - o(l-e)+e,  is  now  the  effective  intertemporal
P
substitution  elasticity.
Now,  a  few  points  regarding  the  range  of  parameters:  First,  substituting
from  (24)  into  (23),  we  see  that  u(CH)  =  e(R).[Az-C 1- 9 e]  -1-}/(l-o),  where
(R)  =  (R)(  . We  require  that  the  net  effect  of  consumption  on  utility
be  positive,  so  that  e  <1.  Also,  local  concavity  of  the  integrand  in  (1),
requires  8au/8iK  <  0.  This  condition  is  satisfied  if  a  <1. 9   Thus,  as  in  the
other  two  models,  the  analysis  is  meaningful  only  in  the  range  of  a  <1.
*
Third,  With  a  >  0,  (because  e<1),  positive  steady  state  growth  rate  of
consumption  requires  that  p  <  r  - y  . On  the  other  hand,  to  guarantee  that
P
the  attainable  utility  W  is  bounded,  the  transversality  condition  (see  earlier
82u/8K2  (1/P 2 ){u  +z [h u +h'u  ]  +  2zh'u  /P.  Given  the  specification  of cc  H  HH  HC
the  u  and  h  functions,  the  expression  inside  the  bracket  [.]  is  negative.
Also,  since  h'  is  negative  and  uCH  =  (l-o)u',  the  last  term  is  negative  if  ar
<1.  Therefore,  a  <1  is  sufficient  but  not  necessary  in  this  context.
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(23)footnotes)  requires  that  X  <  r,  or  that  p  >  r(l-c)(1-e)  - . Thus,  p  is
c  p
bounded  from  below  and  above  by  r(l-o~)(l-9)  - y  <  p  <  r  - y.  Interpretation
P  P
for  equation  (25)  will  be  given  later,  following  the  general  equilibrium
analysis.
Producer Maximization Problem:  The  Contemporaneous Analysis
Final  goods  producers'  demand  for  X  and  R  is  determined  by  the  profit
maximizing  condition  of  equating  the  marginal  value-product  of  X  and  R  in  Q,
from  equation  (18),  to  their  rewards.  Producers  are  assumed  to  be  atomistic
with  respect  to  both  factors,  facing  a  price  w  for  factor  X,  and  and  s  for
factor  R.  Then:
X = P -Q  (26) D  W
R  =P  Q  (27)
D  S
As  mentioned,  the  allocation  of  capital  between  the  sectors  X  and  R  and  Q  is
obtained  by  equating  its  marginal  product  in  each  sector,  to  each  other  and  to
the  given  r,
P(1-a-P)Q/K  =  wm  =  sn  =  r,  (28)
Given  the  linearity  of  X  in  Kx,  and  R  in  KR,  the  X  and  R  sectors'  demand  for  K
is  entirely  elastic  while  their  price  w  and  s  is  related  to  the  return  to
capital,  r,  via  equations,  w  =  r/m  and  s  =  r/n.
Market  Clearing Conditions
Equating  the  supply  and  demand  for  X  from  equations  (20)  and  (26)  and  for
R  from  equations  (21)  and  (27),  we  find:
XD  =  P  Q  =  X  =  mK  (29) W  x
and
18R  =  P  - Q =  R  =  nK
D  S  R (30)
Finally,  demand  for  capital  in  all  three  industries  must  add  up  to  the  supply:
K  +K+  K=  K  (31) Q  x  R
The  market  clearing  condition  for  Q  must  require  K  units  of  the
consumption  goods  C,  to  be  converted  to  investment  goods,  so  that  K  represents
forgone  consumption.  With  this  in  mind,  goods  market  equilibrium  requires
that:
C  =  Q -K/P  (32)
Comparing  this  with  the  representative  household  budget  constraint  (equation
17),  gives:
PQ  =  rK  (33)
Not  surprisingly,  Walras  Law  holds  and  the  value  of  output  is  total  factor
income.
Contemporaneous Solution
Equations  (18),(20),  (21),  (26),  (27),  the  three  equations  in  (28),
equations  (29)-(31),  and  equation  (33)  can  be  solved  to  determine  the
equilibrium  quantities  and  prices  in  terms  of  the  stock  of  capital.  These
are:
X(t)  =  mpK(t)  (34)
R(t)  =  na  K(t)  (35)
K  (t)  =  (l-a-I)K(t)  (36)
Q
K  (t)  =  pK(t)  (37)
X
K  (t)  =  aK(t)  (38)
R
19Q(t)  =  (1-a-19) 1-a-(n3)ao)(K(t)  (9
P  =  r/(1a--)13)I-Ba(n~)~  )3  (40)
w  =  r/m  (41)
s  = r/n  (42)
1-/3 (mro) z  =  (43)
(1-a-  ) I-O-(na)M
Given  the  specification  of  the  production  functions  X  and  Q,  the  interest  rate
r  is  not  uniquely  determined,  i.e.  the  solution  will  support  any  value  of  r,
so  that  r  will  be  also  exogenously  determined,  a  feature  of  the  constant
returns  technology  of  the  production  functions  in  both  sectors.
Equilibrium Growth Path
Given  the  exogenous  determination  of  r,  the  prices  P  and  w,  as  well  as  the
concentration  ratio  remain  time  invariant  (equations  40  - 43).  Thus  P/P  in
equation  (25)  drops  out,  so  that:
r-p
y  C/C  =  (44)
Furthermore  all  quantities  in  equations  (34)  - (39)  grow  at  the  same  rate  as
the  capital  stock:
S  x  R = KQ  Kx  =   K  (45)
To  relate  these  to  the  growth  rate  of  consumption,  we  return  to  the  budget
constraint,  equation  (17),  noting  that  unlike  the  earlier  analysis  where  R  was
viewed  fixed  by  consumers,  this  time  R  is  a  variable  in  the  general
equilibrium  analysis.  We  have:
20
(39)rK  - K  r-  K(46)
c  PC  rK(4 rK  - K
Divide  the  numerator  and  denominator  of  the  last  quotient  by  K  and  rewrite
K/K  as  (K/K)/(K/K).  Then  note  that  K/K  =  K"  If  we  assume  steady-state
growth  rate,  so  that  all  variables  grow  at  a  constant  rate.  Then  K/K  =  K/K  =
yK,  and  yK  is  constant.  Then  equation  (46)  becomes:
2
K -
K r7c  =  =  yK  (47)
r  -
From  this  equation  and  equation  (45)  we  see  that  in  steady  state  all  variables
grow  at  the  same  constant rate.  Dropping  the  subscript  we  denote  this  rate  by
7,  where  from  equation  (44):
r-p
S=  - (48)
0"
*
Recall  that  - 8e  +  (1-8)o  and  that  o  <  1.  Thus,  the  discussion  of  the
socially  optimal  growth  rate  in  equation  (7),  now  also  applies  to  the  case  of
the  equilibrium  growth  rate  (48),  with  6  replacing  b.  In  particular  8'/89  <
0,  i.e.  equilibrium  growth  declines,  the  higher  are  the  adverse  health
consequences  of  consumption.  That  the  present  competitive  solution  is
equivalent  to  the  socially  optimum  solution  of  section  II  (for  8=b)  is  because
knowing  8,  individual  households  can  now  influence  their  own  level  of  health,
by  controlling  their  total  ingestion  of  C,  in  manner  that  is  equivalent  to  the
central  planner  doing  so  on  their  behalf  in  Section  II.  As  it  turns  out,  the
divergence  between  the  efficient  and  the  equilibrium  path  stems  from  a
different  source,  as  outlined  below.
Efficient (Socially Optimal Path)
Despite  the  ability  of  the  consumers  to  affect  their  embodied  component
21of  their  health  via  the  market  mechanism,  the  market  will  still  provide  a
sub-optimal  solution  to  this  problem  because  the  privately  optimal  path  of
capital  accumulation  does  not  provide  incentives  for  technical  substitution
that  can  occur  between  environmentally,  and  thus  health-neutral,  investments
(K)  and  health  non-neutral  inputs  R  or  X  (whether  or  not  the  health  effect  is
direct,  as  in  the  case  of  X,  or  via  the  environment,  as  in  the  case  of  R).  In
this  case,  a  socially  optimal  path  is  equivalent  to  a  sustainable growth  path,
i.e.  growth  when  the  above  externalities  are  internalized  via  some
institutional mechanism.
In  this  case,  we  maximize  (1)  subject  to  the  health  function  (16)  and  the
budget  constraint  (17)  with  z  and  R  and  variables,  so  that  a  central  planner
is  also  aware  of  the  equations  governing  the  evolution  of  z  and  R,  via
equations  (33)  and  (43).  Since  z  in  equation  (43)  is  time-independent,
however,  its  value  can  be  represented  by  z0  (as  a  function  of  s,  r,  and
technology  parameters),  which  is  constant  in  time.  With  z  a  constant  and
with  R(t)  given  from  equation  (35)  in  terms  of  K(t),  the  health  function  of
equation  (24)  is  now  a  function  of  both  consumption  and  capital  stock,  H  =
h(C,K).  Thus,  the  Euler  equation  of  the  private  choice  (eq.  22)  includes  this
added  dependence  of  H  on  K:
(u+  z  hu  )(r-p  +  Pu  H)  +  PuH  +
C  OCH  HK  HK
2  2
[u  +  2z hu  +  (hu  +  hu  )z]c =  0  (49)
cc  0  C  CH  C  HH  CC  H  0
where  P/P  of  equation  (22)  has  also  been  dropped.  Now,  with  z  =  z  and  R(t)  =
O
noK(t),  from  (35),  the  explicit  form  of  the  health  function  in  (24)  becomes:
-0-8'  - 8  -e'
H(t)  =  Az  C(t)-  [niK(t)]  H  C(t)-eK(t)  (24')
o  o
where  H  captures  the  time-independent  terms.  Using  this  function  together 0
22with  the  utility  function  of  the  previous  section,  minor  simplifications  will
yield  the  following  equation  for  the  socially  optimal  path,  :
s
r  - p  ,  r-7K
S=  - - (50)
s  1  -8
With  =  s  ,  the  socially  optimum  rate  is:
(1  - 0 )r  - p
S=  (51)
S  0T  -
where  0  =  8'/(1-9)  represents  environmental  and  health  externality  effects
combined.  Note  that  a  positive  socially  optimal  growth  rate  implies  that  C  <
min  (1,'*).  In  any  case,  must  be  <  1,  which  implies  that  0+8'  <1.  Thus,
the  adverse  elasticity  of  health  to  the  embodied  (residue)  and  disembodied
(environmental)  effects  of  production  must  be  sufficiently  small  and,  in  any
case,  less  than  unity  in  absolute  value  for  a  positive  socially  optimal  growth
rate  to  exist.  This  is  a  stronger  requirement  than  that  for  an  equilibrium
growth  rate  to  exist.  Further,  the  transversality  condition  requires  that  y*
<  r. 1   From  (51)  this  means  that  p  >  r  (l-o*)  =  r(1-<)(l-e),  which  in  turn  is
the  same  condition  needed  for  the  transversality  condition  for  the  case  of  the
equilibrium growth  path  (as  yp  =  0.)
Comparing  y  in  (51)  with  y  in  (48),  two  effects  emerge.  First,  compare
the  term  (l-C)r,  present  in  the  numerator  of  ,  with  r  in  the  numerator  of  Y.
This  effect  shows  that  investments  in  the  X  and  R  sectors  of  the  economy
lowerthe  growth  rate.  This  is  because  of  the  negative  impact  of  both  sectors
10 The  Current  Value  Hamiltonian  in  this  case  involves  an  objective  function
that  explicitly  depends  on  K(t),  so  that  we  can  follow  the  approach  of
footnote  (9).
23on  the  health  of  consumers.  Specifically  this  means  that  if  consumers  were
able  to  influence  the  levels  of  X  and  R,  collectively  or  via  the  government,
they  would  prefer to  increase  consumption  over  time  by  a  smaller amount  than
if  they  acted  atomistically.  This  would  also  lower  the  rate  of  capital
accumulation.  In  effect  the  return  to  the  capital  stock  is  now  less  than  r
because  of  these  two  effects.  Note  that  a  rise  in  either  8'  or  8  increase  the
size  of  this  externality,  g,  via  the  numerator.
However,  this  overstates  the  negative  externality  effect,  since  also
appears  in  the  denominator  of  (51),  acting  as  a  positive  externality.  This
second  effect  may  be  called  an  induced  external  effect.  It  captures  the  fact
that  reduced  growth  rate  of  consumption  induces  an  increase  in  capital
accumulation  in  health-neutral  investments.  The  relation  of  the  second  effect
to  capital  accumulation  can  also  be  seen  by  the  presence  of  2K  in  the  version
of  7  represented  by  equation  (50).
To  find  the  net  effect,  calculate  X  - y:
- r(l-*)  - p  (52)
As  we  have  seen  from  the  discussion  following  equation  (51),  a  positive  growth
rate  for  the  efficient path  Xs  means  that  g  < min  (1,o*).  This  means  that  g  <
r*  so  that  the  denominator  of  (52)  is  positive.  Since  the  numerator  is
negative  (by  the  transversality  condition),  it  follows  that  y  <  . Thus,  the
net  effect  of  the  negative  externalities  that  arise  because  of  the  adverse
health  consequences  of  X  and  R  dominate,  rendering  the  welfare  maximizing
(efficient)  growth  path  smaller  than  the  privately  optimal  path.  This
is  the  same  result  that  was  also  found  in  the  previous  two  models.
Impact  of  8':  From  equation  (51)  and  the  definition  of  (,  we  have,
y  /  =  8'/8.  The  sign  of  the  latter  depends  on  the  sign  of  the
s  1-8
24expression,  2  =  r(l  - 0*)  - p,  which  is  negative  by  the  transversality
condition.  Thus,  8~  /89'  <0,  as  one  would  expect.
S
Impact of  6:  Comparing  with  7  :  In  order  to  gauge  the  influence  of  6
on  7  as  against  7,  we  differentiate  7  in  6,  holding  o*  constant  (since  o*  is
common  in  both  X  and  y  )  to  find,  8f/ael8  =  e9/(l-e) 2ay8/8a.  The  sign  of
this  derivative  is  again  negative  by  the  expression,  (,  and  thus  8'  /a e.<0.
Thus,  higher  values  of  6  mean  greater  divergence  between  the  socially
efficient  and  the  equilibrium  rate,  by  reducing  further  the  efficient  rate,
already  lower  than  the  equilibrium  rate.
Path of  Environmental Decay
As  in  the  other  two  models,  the  rate  of  change  of  environmental  quality
is  inversely  related  to  growth;  so  that  for  the  equilibrium  path,  c  =  -e'y  and
for  the  efficient  path,  c*  =  -8e'9 . Because,  7y  <  y  environmental  quality
S  8
deteriorates  at  a  slower  rate  under  the  efficient  path,  generalizing  results
of  Section  III.  Similar  conclusions  hold  for  the  rate  at  which  health
deteriorates,  seen  by  letting  ha  H/H,  and  noting  that  h  =  -(9+0')7  versus  h
-(e+e')y  .
Finally,  the  adverse  effect  of  increasing  one  of  the  parameters,  for
example  6',  on  the  rate  of  environmental  deterioration  is  subject  to  similar
trade-offs,  as  in  Section  III,  though  it  is  more  difficult  to  determine  here
weather  this rate  is  also  bounded  as  was  the  case  in  that section.
Conclusion:
The  approach  taken  in  endogenous  growth  theories  in  which  economic  growth
is  a  result  of  endogenous  decisions  by  atomistic  agents  (as  opposed  to
technology-led  Solow-growth)  is  a  natural  framework  to  analyze  growth  and  the
25environment,  because  environment  affects  the  utility  function  and  thus  the
decision  to  consume  versus  to  invest.  Further,  the  clear  distinction  that
such  models  provide  between  the  equitibrium  and  the  efficient  growth  paths,
stems  from  the  key  role  of  externalities  in  the  endogenous  growth  literature,
and  externalities  are  of  course  at  the  root  of  any  economic  analysis  of
environmental  problems.  Comparison  between  the  equilibrium  and  the  efficient
paths  do  provide  many  insights  and  suggest  how  policies  that  ameliorate  the
adverse  health  or  environmental  effects  of  production  or  consumption  would
impact  the  equilibrium  and  the  socially  efficient  growth  path  of  the  economy.
All  models  point  to  a  negative  relation  between  growth  rate  (along  either
equilibrium  or  efficient  paths),  and  quality  of  the  environment  as  manifest
through  health.  Although  it  would  have  been  possible  to  permit  some  exogenous
rate  of  environmental  regeneration  or  technological  change  that  would  allow
for  growth  but  would  retain  the  quality  of  the  environment,  such  addition
would  have  been  conceptually  trivial,  only  complicating  the  algebra  but  not
contributing  genuinely  to  the  models  of  this  paper  (which  in  effect  take  the
exogenous  rate of  technological  change  to  be  zero).
Instead,  the  understanding  of  how  environment  and  growth  can  be  made
compatible  and  even  reinforcing  of  one  another  requires  an  approach  based
endogenously induced technological  change.  The  pioneering  works  of  Ruttan  and
Hayami  (1971)  which  pointed  the  way  for  such  investigation  in  the  area  of
agriculture,  can  be  applied  to  the  area  of  environment,  using  the  more
sophisticated  new  tools  borrowed  from  the  endogenous  growth  literature.  It  is
most  interesting  that  the  authors'  reason  for  why  Japanese  agriculture  took  on
land  saving  innovation  in  the  60's  and  70's  (because  of  its  land  scarcity)
finds  equal  applicability  to  the  Japanese  innovation  in  the  area  of  fossil
fuel-saving  innovations  (because  of  the  scarcity  of  fossil  fuel)  which  has  led
26to  a  nearly  50  percent  reduction  in  CO2  emission  over  the  course  of  the  1980's
while  simultaneously  enjoying  very  high  growth  rates.
The  important  message  of  this  paper  is  that  in  the  absence  of  induced
technological  innovation  in  which  increased  deterioration  of  the  environment
would  induce  fundamental  transformation  of  the  knowledge-base,  growth  may  not
be  environmentally  friendly  in  the  long  run,  even  along  the  efficient  path.
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